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INTRODUCTION
It has been commonplace to speak of central bank independence-as if it were both a reality and a necessity. Discussions of the Fed invariably refer to legislated independence and often to the famous 1951 Accord that apparently settled the matter.
1 While everyone recognizes the Congressionally imposed dual mandate, the Fed has substantial discretion in its interpretation of the vague call for high employment and low inflation. For a long time economists presumed those goals to be in conflict, but in recent years Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan seemed to have successfully argued that pursuit of low inflation rather automatically supports sustainable growth with maximum feasible employment.
In any event, nothing is more sacrosanct than the supposed independence of the central bank from the treasury, with the economics profession as well as policymakers ready to defend the prohibition of central bank "financing" of budget deficits. As in many developed nations, this prohibition was written into US law from the founding of the Fed in 1913. In practice, the prohibition is easy to evade, as we found during World War II in the US when budget deficits ran up to a quarter of GDP. If a central bank stands ready to buy government bonds in the secondary market to peg an interest rate, then private banks will buy bonds in the new-issue market and sell them to the central bank at a virtually guaranteed price. Since central bank purchases of bonds supply the reserves needed by banks to buy bonds, a virtuous circle is created so that the Treasury faces no financing constraint. That is what the 1951 Accord was supposedly all about-ending the cheap source of US Treasury finance.
Since the global financial crisis (GFC) hit in 2007, these matters have come to the fore in both the US and the European Monetary Union (EMU). In the US, discussion of "printing money" to finance burgeoning deficits was somewhat muted, in part because the Fed purportedly undertook quantitative easing (QE) to push banks to lend-not to provide the Treasury with cheap funding. But the impact has been the same as World War II-era finances:
very low interest rates on government debt even as a large portion of the debt ended up on the 1 Thorvald Grung Moe examines the role of Marriner Eccles and the discussions and events that led up to the 1951 Accord. Eccles was a dominant figure in the transformation of the Fed from the relatively weak and decentralized institution that had been created in 1913 to the modern central bank we know now. Moe makes a strong case that the vision of Eccles was instrumental in that evolution; as we will see, modern theories of central banks, books of the Fed, while bank reserves have grown to historic levels (the Fed also purchased and lent against private debt, adding to excess reserves). While hyperinflationists have been pointing to the fact that the Fed is essentially "printing money" (actually reserves) to finance the budget deficits, most other observers have endorsed the Fed's notion that QE might allow it to "push on a string" by spurring private banks to lend-which is thought to be desirable and certainly better than "financing" budget deficits to allow government spending to grow the economy. Growth through fiscal austerity is the new motto as the Fed accumulates ever more federal government debt and suspect mortgage-backed securities.
The other case is in the EMU, where the European Central Bank (ECB) had long been presumed to be prohibited from buying debt of the member governments. By design, these governments were supposed to be disciplined by markets, to keep their deficits and debt within the Maastricht criteria. Needless to say, things have not turned out quite as planned. The ECB's balance sheet has blown up just as the Fed's did-and there is no end in sight in Euroland even as the Fed has begun to taper. It would not be hyperbole to predict that the ECB will end up owning (or at least standing behind) most EMU government debt as it continues to expand its backstop.
It is, then, perhaps a good time to reexamine the thinking behind central bank independence. There are several related issues. Inflation? Insolvency?
While this working paper will focus on the US and the Fed, the analysis is relevant to general discussions about central bank independence. We will limit our analysis to the questions surrounding what we mean by central bank independence and in what sense is the Fed independent. We leave to other analyses the questions surrounding the wisdom of granting independence to the Fed, democratic accountability, and potential problems. We will argue here that the Fed is independent only in a very narrow sense. We have argued elsewhere that the Fed's crisis response during the global financial crisis does raise serious issues of transparency and accountability-issues that have not been resolved with the Dodd-Frank legislation. 2 Finally, it will become apparent that we do not believe that lack of central bank independence raises significant problems with inflation or insolvency of the sovereign government.
For the US case we will draw on an excellent study of the evolution of governance of the 4 In the aftermath of the GFC, Congress has attempted to exert greater control with its Dodd-Frank legislation. The Fed handled most of the US policy response to the Great Recession (or, GFC). As we have documented, most of the rescue was behind closed doors and intended to remain secret (See Felkerson 2012; and Wray 2012) 5 . Much of it at least stretched the law and perhaps went beyond the now famous section 13(3) that had been invoked for "unusual and exigent" circumstances for the first time since the Great Depression. Congress has demanded greater transparency and has tightened restrictions on the Fed's future crisis response.
Paradoxically, Dodd-Frank also increased the Fed's authority and responsibility. However, in some sense this is déjà vu because Congressional reaction to the Fed's poor response to the onset of the Great Depression was similarly paradoxical as Congress simultaneously asserted more control over the Fed while broadening the scope of the Fed's mission.
INDEPENDENT OF WHAT?
Most references to central bank independence are little more than vague hand-waves. In the US, (quoted in Shull p. 4). The Board was to be "a distinctly nonpartisan organization and was to be wholly divorced from politics." (ibid p. 5). According to Paul Warburg, governance was to be maintained by a "system of checks and counter-checks -a paralyzing system which gives powers with one hand and takes them away with the other." (ibid ). In other words, the idea was that by ensuring broad representation of interests, the Fed would be stymied by a "clash of interests" that would reduce the damage it might do; as Shull puts it, "The checks and balances thus constituted a form of internal governance." 8 (ibid p. 5). That of course sounds somewhat familiar as a typically American approach to governance.
When World War I came along, however, the Fed turned its attention to supporting the Treasury's debt issue. In the inflationary period at the end of the war, the regional Feds raised discount rates sharply (up to a marginal 87%) and a deep retraction followed that led to deflation of farm prices. Congress revisited the governance issue as some critics wanted to force (Shull p. 12 ).
In the However, yet again, Congress actually extended Fed responsibility to include authority over large, systemically important non-bank financial institutions. Still, the Act restricted application of Section 13(3) in future crises, and for some actions required approval from the Treasury. It also mandated increased transparency (including a review by the GAO of all the Fed's emergency assistance after the GFC). Congress also created the Financial Stability Oversight Council that is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and includes heads of agencies involved in overlooking the financial sector-including the Fed. In that manner it diluted the Fed's power somewhat. Exactly what difference all this will make for the response in the next crisis cannot be foreseen in advance.
Independent from Congress: Discretion in Selecting Tools
The strongest case for Fed independence would be in its discretion to choose the tools and If we recall the old textbooks, there was a distinction among tools, targets, and goals.
Goals are usually defined in terms of unemployment, inflation, and growth; in the case of the US, there is the dual (or quadruple) mandate but it is itself vague. The Fed does not set specific goals (i.e., specific inflation rates or unemployment rates), although a number of central banks have adopted narrow ranges for acceptable inflation rates. In that case there is a synthesis of target and goal-the central bank targets an inflation rate that serves as a measure of monetary policy success; employment and output growth are then expected by-products of hitting the inflation target. However, the Fed has not followed that practice, preferring greater discretionary leeway.
Since inflation, by itself, would not seem to be a sufficient goal of policy-making, either the inflation target could be changed if it were inconsistent with other goals, or the other goals would be moved to the sphere of fiscal policy. The less extreme policy (and the one adopted in the US) is to target "the" interest rate to hit the goals. In practice there are many interest rates, so central banks typically target the overnight interbank rate (fed funds rate in the US) with a view to affecting other market rates. However, as there is no close correspondence between "the" interest rate and the Congressionally mandated goals (that are themselves vague), the Fed has a great deal of discretion over its setting of the interest rate target. In practice, almost any rate target could be justified as consistent with the goals.
The old monetarist preference was instead for a quantitative target (reserves) that would allow the central bank to control money growth. That was then supposed to allow the central bank to keep inflation low-although monetarists tended to argue against accelerating inflation rather than against inflation, as the economic costs of a low-to-moderate but stable inflation rate
were not believed to be high. In any case, except where legislative mandate sets an inflation target, central banks are typically left to choose their targets (except when it comes to war finance-as discussed below). Modern central banks have dropped monetary (quantitative) targets in favor of interest rate (price) targets-both because they are easier to hit and because the current thinking is that they are more reliably linked to the goals. The dominance of that "market" approach was all the more obvious in the GFC as the Fed created an alphabet soup of facilities to provide reserves "to the market" through auctions rather than lending them to banks at the discount window. The argument has long been that forcing banks to the discount window penalizes them through demonstration effects or "frown costs." (Canada has for some time offered an alternative, in which the central bank pays interest on positive reserve balances and charges an overdraft fee for banks that are short; there are presumably no "frown costs.") During the debate in the 1960s, monetarists preferred open market operations on the argument that this better protects market forces-to allocate reserves and also to determine interest rates. However, if the Fed sets the discount rate and announces a fed funds rate target, the market is not setting those rates. Still, the way the Fed auctioned reserves during the crisis would seem more consistent with the market-based approach.
In conclusion, "independence" could refer to choice of tools-discount window versus open market purchases to supply reserves, discount window or overnight markets to determine interest rates, and required reserve ratios to determine deposit multipliers. The precise operating procedures used have actually changed substantially over the years, and there is no reason to suppose that these changes were not made to facilitate fiscal operations. Generally speaking, the Treasury receives payments (mostly taxes) in its deposit accounts held at private banks and then shifts them to the Fed in order to spend. The Fed debits the reserves of the private banks when the deposits are shifted. Treasury spending reverses that as reserves are credited to banks receiving deposits (recipients of Treasury spending). If all of this were accomplished instantaneously, it is obvious that the operations net-out if Treasury's spending equals its tax receipts. In that case, there is no impact on private bank reserves or deposits. If however tax receipts are less than government spending, bank deposits and reserves would be net credited. When tax receipts are greater than government spending, there need not be any net impact on private bank reserves and deposits so long as the Treasury does not move its extra receipts to the Fed. In practice, the Treasury attempts to maintain a constant (small) positive account balance at the Fed, which ensures that fiscal operations do not affect private bank and reserve balances.
According to MacLaury,

When the balance between spending and taxation results in government deficits, the Treasury has to issue additional public debt. In a monetary sense, the failure to tax adequately to cover the expenditures of the Federal government is an invitation for "printing money" through the issuance of federal debt. Depending on the phase of the business cycle, this tends to increase the money supply and, without offsetting action by the central bank, can result in an inflationary rise in prices. The result is "hidden taxation"-which takes away from taxpayers in the form of lower purchasing power (higher prices) what they would have paid in additional taxes had the expended funds been obtained through that source. Thus there is an important linkage between the taxing and spending powers of Congress and the monetary powers as delegated to the Federal Reserve System. In principle, it is the job of Congress and the executive branch jointly to define the economic policy objectives of our national government, and to support those objectives with appropriate fiscal measures. Then the central bank can coordinate monetary policy in a manner which serves those national objectives. When fiscal policy does not match spending appropriately to tax revenues, then the monetary authority is faced with a difficult choice: (a) how severely should it restrain the inflationary forces that may develop, and (b) to what extent should it permit inflationary forces to have their effect in higher prices? When the failure to provide appropriate tax revenues generates acute forces of inflation, then even the best compromise may require severe monetary restraint. This has the effect of appearing to be at cross-purposes with congressional intent and can also produce severe disruptions in some areas of the private sector such as housing. (p. 8).
Note that MacLaury does not imply that the Fed might try to prevent the Treasury from deficit spending; rather the Fed's "independence" is strictly limited to its decision over whether to tighten monetary policy to fight any inflationary pressures that the deficits might fuel. While MacLaury was writing in a time in which it was believed that tight policy means slowing money growth, we now associate policy tightening with raising the interest rate target. Still, the important point is that when read together with the previous quotes from MacLaury and Newman, we presume that the Fed is to cooperate with the Treasury so that the fiscal operations proceed smoothly. The Fed's choice is not to refuse to "cut checks" so that the Treasury can spend funds allocated by Congress, but rather to tighten policy if it believes fiscal policy is too expansive.
How do the Treasury and Fed ensure that budget deficits over a time period (spending greater than receipts) do not affect bank reserves and deposits? The key is "debt management": new issues of Treasuries by the Treasury and/or open market sales by the Fed. As mentioned, there have been significant operational changes over the years, but conceptually, it is not difficult to understand the balance sheet operations that need to take place. To spend more than tax receipts, the Treasury needs additional deposits in its accounts at private banks-to be shifted to the Fed before spending. Note that if it were to buy treasuries, it would need to buy the quantity of treasuries the Treasury had just sold! While the Fed would not have violated the "independence" provided by the prohibition on direct purchases of Treasury debt, it would end up with the Treasury's debt anyway. While the Fed can choose whether to use open market operations or the discount window, it really cannot refuse to supply the reserves. First, that would cause bank reserves to go below desired or required reserves (assuming they were operating without excess reserve positions). But more importantly, it would cause the fed funds rate to rise above target. If a central bank targets overnight rates, it must accommodate demand for reserves. In other words, the central bank's "independent" interest rate-setting conflicts with its "independence" from fiscal operations, in the sense that it must provide the reserves banks will need when the Treasury moves the proceeds from a bond sale to its account at the Fed in order to make payments.
When the Treasury does spend these proceeds, the deposits and reserves of banks are restored. At this point, the Fed will need to reverse its previous operation: banks will now have excess reserves that can be drained either through an open market sale of Treasuries by the Fed (that is, the Fed sells the Treasuries it just bought) or the Fed and banks wind down discount window loans. (Note the Fed for some time has used repos and reverse repos rather than outright sales and purchases-which ensures actions can be quickly reversed to minimize the Treasury's operational impacts on bank reserves.)
At the end of this process we find that deficit spending by the Treasury results in higher private bank deposits as well as greater Treasury holdings. (Note it does not matter whether banks sell the Treasuries to households-in that case, bank holdings of treasuries as well as bank liabilities to households are reduced by the amount of the sale; the treasuries will be in household portfolios rather than in bank portfolios.) All of this is just a logical explication of the balance sheet operations that would need to occur given the twin constraints that treasury cannot sell bonds directly to the central bank and that it needs to move deposits from private banks to the central bank before spending.
In practice, there are many other ways fiscal operations could be accomplished. If the Treasury sold bonds directly to the Fed, the private banks would not need to act as intermediaries: the Fed would credit the Treasury's account directly, and Treasury spending would lead to private bank deposits and reserves increasing. To drain the reserves created, the Fed would sell on the bonds it had just bought. The end result would be as described above.
Note the same thing could be accomplished if the Fed allowed the Treasury to run an "overdraft" on its account. In that case, the Treasury would cut a check and a private bank would credit the account of the recipient and the Fed would credit the bank's reserves. At that point there would be excess reserves in the banks that could be drained by a bond sale by the Treasury (new issue) or an open market sale by the Fed. The first would allow the Treasury to eliminate its overdraft; the second would move the Treasury debt off the Fed's balance sheet and into the nongovernment sector.
Or, the Fed could provide the overdrafts to banks by allowing "float" to simplify the process. In that case, the banks buy bonds issued by Treasury and credit the Treasury's account; when the Treasury transfers its funds to the Fed, the Fed does not debit bank reserves on the presumption that they'll be restored as soon as the Treasury spends. The point is that there are different ways to "skin the cat" that are consistent with the legal mandates. Over the years the actual operating procedures adopted have changed substantially as the Fed is substantially "independent" to choose the exact procedures adopted. Further, the general requirements or prohibitions mandated in the Federal Reserve Act can be changed by Congress. For example, Congress could allow the Treasury to sell bonds to the Fed-which would simplify procedures.
A final point to note is that so long as the central bank targets interest rates, its options are limited no matter which procedures are adopted, in the sense that it must operate to minimize fiscal policy effects on reserves and hence on overnight rates. Conforming to the FRA, the Treasury needs to sell treasuries to private banks when its deposit account at the Fed is insufficient, but banks need reserves to allow the Treasury to shift its deposits. If the Fed provides those in an open market purchase, it will need to reverse that once the Treasury does spend. The result of deficit spending by Treasury will normally lead to a nearly equivalent increase of bank holdings of bonds when all is said and done. This will be true no matter what operating procedures the Fed adopts and regardless of the prohibitions written into the FRA.
A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT BALANCE SHEET: IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY OPERATIONS
It has been common in the Modern Money Theory (MMT) literature to begin with a simplified analysis that consolidates the central bank and treasury into a "sovereign government."
Effectively this eliminates any operational independence. Presume the sovereign government issues "currency" when it spends (this can be metallic coins, paper money, wooden tally sticks, or electronic bank entries; note that if currency is an electronic entry then banks must have accounts at the government to be credited-which is the central bank "department" of government). From the vantage point of the nongovernment sector, government payments inject currency into the economy. Further presume government accepts only currency in tax payment (receiving metal coins, paper money, or wooden tally sticks in payment, or debiting electronic bank entries). Deficit spending means net currency emission; budget surpluses mean net currency outstanding is reduced. If the nonbanks (households and firms) do not want to hold currency, it flows into the banks (as reserves) and they issue deposits held by the nonbanks.
If government operates with a positive overnight target, it needs an instrument on which it pays interest (if interest is paid on currency, then to achieve an overnight target that is higher, government needs to issue an instrument that pays a rate higher than what it pays on currency).
Hence, government can issue bonds as an interest-earning alternative to currency (including reserves). Whether there are separate roles to be played by the central bank "department" or the treasury "department," that is entirely within the "sovereign government" and of no consequence to the nongovernment. Note if the nonbank sector (households and firms) wants to hold bonds rather than currency, then banks will hold the currency (in the form of reserves).
(New) bank deposits outstanding at the end of the fiscal process equal bank holdings of currency (reserves) plus government bonds; nonbanks hold a combination of currency, demand deposits, and bonds; the quantity of demand deposits held by households and firms equals bank holdings of government bonds and currency (reserves)-which equals the government's deficit spending.
This simplified exposition has been criticized on the argument that it is unrealistic-in the real world, the treasury and central bank are operationally separate, and each has a different kind of relation with the private banks. Banks hold reserves at the central bank; only the treasury has deposits at private banks. So the Fed deals with banks on their asset side while the treasury operates on the liability side of banks. However, of course, banks also hold treasury debt on their asset side and the central bank also accepts bank liabilities at the discount window. But as discussed, operational rules (as well as the law derived from the FRA in the US) maintain a sharp separation such that private banks intermediate between the central bank and the treasury-as the treasury can sell bonds directly to private banks but not to its own bank (the central bank on whose account it draws to spend). Likewise, the instrument typically used in monetary policy to maintain positive interest rates is treasury debt, not central bank debt. (Only recently did the Fed begin to pay interest on its own debt-reserves-effectively eliminating its reliance on Treasury debt to keep the target rate above zero.) It is this complicated bifurcation that introduces private banks directly into operational procedures now required to accomplish sovereign government spending.
The question is whether all of this complexity really matters. If we had the simplified, consolidated government, a budget deficit would lead the nongovernment sector to net accumulate claims on the government. Initially, these would be in the form of currency, but if government offers bonds as an interest-earning alternative, then given portfolio preferences at least some (and probably most) of the currency would be exchanged for bonds. If we separate the Treasury and central bank and impose operational rules like those in the US, then deficit spending will lead to the same results. While bonds might be sold first, and deposits transferred from private banks to the Fed before the Treasury spends, at the end of the spending process banks have issued more deposits and hold some combination of more bonds and more reserves.
Just as in the consolidated example above, bank deposits outstanding at the end of the process equal bank holdings of currency (reserves) plus government bonds; nonbanks hold a combination of currency, demand deposits, and bonds; and the quantity of demand deposits held by households and firms equals bank holdings of government bonds and currency (reserves)-which equals the government's deficit spending.
We conclude this section with the finding that the legislated "operational independence" of the central bank is limited in practice because the actual procedures adopted ensure the central bank cooperates with the treasury as it implements fiscal policy. It is true that the central bank can choose to keep the interest rate paid by treasury on its debt higher, or lower, which impacts overall government spending (since interest is a cost covered by spending).
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
That brings us to the final category, political independence, which is linked to operational independence. The question is whether the (limited) operational independence-the "nonconsolidation" of the treasury and central bank-allows the central bank to "just say no" to the Treasury. That is, could a resolute Fed prevent the Treasury from spending (up to the budgeted amount authorized by Congress)? That would seem to be the only argument that the critics have against consolidation (since the end result in terms of balance sheets is the same).
Let us go through the steps of the process. On current requirements, if the Treasury does not have sufficient deposits in the private banks (tax and loan accounts) to transfer to cover mandated spending, it must first sell bonds. The question is this: will the banks buy them? The answer is pretty simple. We know that even if the banking system has no excess reserves, the Fed will respond to any pressure on interest rates that might be created by banks trying to buy the bonds. If banks are short desired reserves, the Fed supplies them to keep the rate on target.
With an interest rate target the Fed always accommodates. That is the macro level answer.
At the micro level, special banks-dealers-stand ready to buy bonds. To maintain their relationship with the Treasury, they will not refuse. (In the US there are 21 primary dealers obligated to bid at US government debt auctions-there is literally no chance that the US Treasury could fail to sell bonds.) The dealers would then try to place the bonds into markets.
For a sovereign currency issuer that will make interest payments as they come due, there is no fear of involuntary default. It is conceivable that the Treasury has offered maturities that do not match the market's desires. In that case, prices need to adjust to place the treasuries-or the dealers will get stuck with the bonds.
In any case, this mismatch is easily resolved if the Treasury offers only very short maturities. This might not seem obvious unless one realizes that short-maturity treasuries are operationally equivalent to bank reserves that pay a slightly higher interest. As the Fed (like most central banks) targets the overnight rate, reserves can be obtained at that rate. Assuming the central bank is not running an "operation twist" policy (buying longer maturities to target longer term interest rates), it lets the "market" determine rates on longer maturities. (Do not be misled by use of the term "market," as banks can and do collude to set interest rates-remember the LIBOR scandal. The point is that central banks normally set the shortest term interest rates "exogenously" in the policy sense while other rates are determined "endogenously" although perhaps not competitively.) The Treasury can always issue short-term bonds at a small marketdetermined mark-up above the overnight target.
The question is not really "will the banks buy treasuries", but "at what price." Very short-term Treasury debt is a nearly perfect substitute for reserves on which the Fed (now) pays interest. Hence, a slight advantage given to Treasury debt will ensure that (non-dealer) banks will exchange reserves for treasuries. If the Treasury is obstinate, insisting on selling only long maturities, then portfolio preferences can increase rates-perhaps beyond what the Treasury wants to pay. The solution, of course, is to offer maturities the market prefers-or to pay rates necessary to induce the market to take what the Treasury prefers to issue. Clearly this is a very easy "coordination problem" to resolve.
The second step requires that the Treasury move deposits from private banks to the Fed.
At the same time, the private bank reserves are debited. The Fed does not and will not prevent this from occurring. If the transfer should leave banks short of reserves, the Fed accommodates-either through a temporary bond purchase or by lending at the discount window. In practice the Treasury coordinates with the Fed so that the Fed is ready to provide reserves as needed. Again, operating with an overnight target rate requires accommodation of the demand for reserves-it is not a choice if the central bank wants to hit its target.
In the third step, the Treasury writes a check (or tells the Fed to credit the reserves of the recipient's bank, which credits the recipient's account). Again, the Fed does not and will not prevent this. Note that this will add to banking system reserves and hence normally creates excess reserves in the system.
In the fourth step, the Fed removes the excess reserves through an open market sale (or by winding down discount window loans). Of course, this simply reverses the second step. A central bank that is targeting overnight interest rates cannot (normally) leave excess reserves in the system (unless the target is ZIRP-zero-or the central bank already pays interest rates on reserves). In a ZIRP environment (or where the central bank pays the target rate on reserves), excess reserves can remain in the system with the result that interest rates fall to the rate paid on reserves.
In conclusion, we see that there is no place in the current operating procedures for the Fed to prevent the Treasury from spending budgeted amounts. Presumably even if the Treasury tried to spend beyond budgeted amounts-perhaps in an attempt to replicate the experience of the Weimar Republic or Zimbabwe-the Fed would actually be powerless to prevent it (although the Fed could react by raising interest rates-which would actually increase the Treasury's spending on interest, and hence increase the budget deficit). While the current operating procedures-some guided by the FRA of 1913-are believed to have been created to ensure that a runaway Treasury could not finance spending by "running the printing presses," there is actually nothing in those procedures to prevent it.
During World War II the Fed agreed to keep interest rates low on treasuries. It subjugated monetary policy to the war effort-keeping rates low meant that even as the outstanding stock of federal government debt grew quickly, government spending on interest rates did not explode. That is the main fear of deficit worriers: government can get stuck in a debt trap whereby budget deficits increase the outstanding debt on which interest must be paid; as interest payments grow, the deficit itself increases. Even if other spending were not growing fast enough to cause the debt-to-GDP ratio to grow, if interest rates on debt exceed the growth rate of GDP, the debt ratio will generally grow (unless the rest of the budget is in surplus). Fed policy in World War II and through to 1951 ensured that would not happen. The Treasury Accord released the Fed from that commitment, although the Fed's interest rate policy kept the short-term rates very low for another decade. As GDP continued to grow, the federal government debt-to-GDP ratio fell quickly in the postwar period.
What do we learn from that experience? Even with budget deficits of 25% of GDP, a central bank can keep interest rates very low across the maturity structure. As a creature of Congress, this policy could be mandated if it became necessary. Alternatively, the Treasury can restrict its new issues to short-term maturities. In that case, the rate on Treasury bills will closely track the Fed's policy rate. So long as the policy rate is kept below the GDP growth rate, the "debt trap" dynamics can be controlled by Congressional budgeting that would rein in noninterest spending or raise tax rates. (To be sure, a Zimbabwe-bound Congress could try to keep debt growing faster than GDP by accelerating the growth of budget allocations, and the Fed would not be able to prevent that as raising rates higher would just hasten the explosive growth of the debt ratio.) If the Fed insisted on keeping interest rates above GDP growth, it not only would cause government debt ratios to grow, but would also cause private debt ratios to grow.
Sooner or later the economy would probably crash, causing the Fed to relent.
Bad policy-whether monetary or fiscal-is always possible and painful. Fortunately, there is nothing in the post-Great Depression experience to warrant unduly pessimistic views of the motives of either Congress or the Fed. Even the extremes of the Volcker years-short-term rates driven above 20%-were eventually reversed and, one hopes, lessons were learned from the experience. And there is nothing approaching a Congressional consensus that the US government ought to budget to produce hyperinflation.
If anything, all the budgeting errors are on the other side: insufficient fiscal stimulus in the GFC, partisan silliness over expanding the debt limits, tying compromises to sequestration, and an unhealthy fear of budget deficits. While the Fed has a great deal of independence in setting its interest rate target, it appears unlikely that in a crisis (whether induced by excessively high rates on private debt or high rates on public debt that create an exploding debt ratio or a major war that requires cooperation between the Fed and Treasury) the Fed would resolutely pursue dangerous policy. And if it did, Congress can intervene. If all of this is correct, the Fed's independence is limited to its insulation from political pressure and especially freedom from political interference into its rate-setting deliberations.
CONCLUSION: MMT AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
One of the greatest fears about continuous budget deficits is that they might push up interest rates, raising deficits and debt ratios in a self-reinforcing spiral. This is based on the ISLM model where-except in a liquidity trap with a horizontal LM curve, rising government spending raises interest rates. The result is similar to the loanable funds model, in which it is the government's demand for loanable funds to finance a deficit that causes rates to rise. This belief in deficits pressuring interest rates is nearly universal even though it is wrong. Indeed, unless compensating operations are undertaken, budget deficits push rates down since they lead to reserve credits in the banking system. As MMT teaches, the operational function of selling Treasuries is to offer a higher interest earning alternative to low earning reserves (recall that until the GFC reserves paid zero; now they pay a positive rate chosen by the Fed). How much higher? Well that depends on the maturity of the debt issued and the state of liquidity preference. As Keynes's "square" rule implies, when we adopt ZIRP, the Treasury will generally have to pay about 200 basis points to get banks or others to give up liquidity to hold longer maturities. When short-term rates are higher and are expected to fall, the premium required on long term maturities is lower (we can even invert the yield curve structure, with short rates above long rates).
Most "Keynesians" are not worried now about this, believing we are in a liquidity trapas Paul Krugman continually argues. In current conditions, neither deficit spending nor QE is expected to drive up interest rates or inflation. However, many argue that if the government continues to run sustained budget deficits even after recovery, it could get into a debt trap.
Trying to finance those deficits supposedly pushes up interest rates paid by government, which increases debt service costs, which accelerates the growth of budget deficits and raises interest rates more. This creates a vicious cycle that increases the debt-to-GDP ratio. Eventually the bond vigilantes foreclose on the US government which is forced to grovel like the Greek government before the IMF and the ECB.
But that argument misses the point. Short-term rates are determined by monetary policy.
The Fed can pay what it wants on reserves and charge what it wants on lending at the discount window. It targets the fed funds rate and keeps it within the bounds more-or-less set by the other two rates. When the economy begins to expand, the Fed will most likely raise rates. (And while it might raise rates in response to budget deficits, that is clearly a policy decision, and not something that markets do to a sovereign nation.) Deficits increase bank reserves, and sustained deficits will result in excess reserve positions unless countervailing action is taken. Excess reserves put downward pressure on the fed funds rate. The Fed can sell government bonds (open market sale) to relieve that pressure, or the Treasury can sell new bonds. In either case, the operational impact is to substitute Treasuries for excess reserves (it is the opposite of QE). And note that if no such action is taken, budget deficits push interest rates down, not up.
What interest rate will Treasury need to pay to sell those treasuries? Well, it depends on the maturity of the issues and the state of liquidity preference at the time. The Treasury could choose to sell short term obligations (bills) at a rate that tracks the Fed's target rate; or it can sell longer maturities. This is part of Treasury "debt management." But note that it is a policy choice, not a bond vigilante choice. Markets cannot force the Treasury to sell long maturities.
Could the Fed try to make the US grovel like Greeks have had to do in the EMU crisis?
Yes, it could implement a Volcker-style shock, pushing rates above 20%, which could get the US government into a vicious interest rate-growing debt cycle. It would of course do the same to the private sector-whose debt ratio is already a lot higher than that of the federal government. As the currency issuer, the federal government can probably hold out a lot longer than the private sector. It is not likely that the Fed would be able to pursue such policy long enough to put the sovereign government into a Weimar deficit situation, because it would kill the private sector first by causing massive insolvency and cascading defaults. That is what Volcker did. And note that the private sector crashed and was eventually pulled out of recession by rising Reagan budget deficits. Volcker vigilantism did not cause the Reagan government to retrench. Rather, it cut taxes and increased military spending.
One cannot completely rule out bad policy. That is the weakness of democracy. And every other form of government. The good thing about democracy is that voters can throw the elected officials out every now and then. While the Fed is not directly responsible to voters, it is subject to Congressional action.
The problem is that most people think Fed independence is natural, desirable, and immutable. But in reality, the Fed is a branch of government and a creature of Congress. So the question comes down to this: Can the Fed go vigilante without Congress putting it back into its proper place? Those who adopt MMT believe that such a fear represents poor understanding of political economy, and in addition of the Fed's mandate as defined by Congress.
Let us conclude with a quick summary of the alternative MMT perspective on Fed "independence."
Modern money is a state money: the state chooses the money of account, imposes taxes in that unit, and accepts payment in that unit. The state usually issues its own IOUs denominated in the same unit, and accepts its own IOUs in payment. Other entities typically also issue IOUs denominated in the state's money of account; issuers must accept their own IOUs in redemption.
There is a hierarchy of monetary IOUs with the state's currency (including central bank reserves) at the top and used for clearing among financial institutions. State and bank IOUs must be issued first before they can be returned to their issuers in payment (redemption). Logically, the state must issue its currency through its spending or through lending before it can receive its currency in payment. The same is true of banks taken as a whole: they must lend their notes or deposits into existence before their creditors (note holders or depositors) can make payments to the banks. Unlike banks, however, the sovereign can ensure demand for its currency by imposing obligatory payments-such as taxes-that have to be paid in the sovereign's currency.
All of this was more transparent when sovereigns spent by "raising a tally" or by minting new coin to finance a war. It became a bit more obscure when they would offer exchequer bills for discounting by private banks, obtaining notes they would spend and collect in taxes. And after one bank was given monopoly power to become the state's own bank-a central bankmatters apparently became opaque to many observers. The state no longer spent its IOUs, but rather ran its fiscal operations through its central bank, issuing bills, receiving credits to its account, spending central bank IOUs and receiving the same in tax payments. Much later, the private banks were brought into a triangle, with treasury spending leading to credits to private bank deposits, and taxes paid out of private bank accounts-with the central bank then intermediating between the private banks and the Treasury to facilitate these fiscal operations.
All of this obscured sovereign finances, making it easier to suppose that the sovereign currency issuer operates like a household, receiving income (taxes), spending out of its receipts and "borrowing" if it was short.
Problems with excessive bank note issue-due to wartime spending, or note issues to finance speculative excesses, or issues of counterfeit notes-led to attempts to tie paper money to precious metal. The relatively brief experience with a gold standard changed thinking about sovereign finance and about "paper money" more generally. An alternative view evolved that maintained that it is necessary to tie the currency (and private bank notes) to metal. In the 1920s, the deposit multiplier was discovered, linking private deposit expansion to central bank reserves (themselves backed by gold). Gold was abandoned in the Great Depression and replaced with Bretton Woods and a Keynesian approach to fiscal finances. However, in the 1950s the quantity theory was "restated" by M. Friedman, bringing the money stock to prominence but ironically consigning money to a bit part, determining nominal values. The understanding of sovereign finance discussed above was lost. In the late 1960s the microeconomic household budget constraint was applied to government budgets (spending is "financed" by taxes, borrowing, or money printing). We've essentially been stuck with that view ever since. A sovereign's budget is "just like a household's," so it must adopt "sound finance."
In the MMT view, that is precisely wrong. A sovereign currency issuer is nothing like a household user of the currency. Indeed, our understanding of sovereign finance is better informed by returning to the tally sticks or coins that sovereigns "spent" into circulation and then collected in taxes. Modern operational procedures obscure but do not substantially modify the logic.
Before concluding, let us return to the issue of central bank independence. There are a number of indices that claim to rank central banks according to degree of independence, and some studies link that to inflation. These typically rank the US Fed (and the Bundesbank before unification, or the ECB after unification) as relatively independent. Even if we dismiss the claim that bond market vigilantes can push up sovereign interest rates by arguing that the central bank can control rates, there is the possibility that, say, the Fed would refuse to relieve pressure on the Federal government's finances. However, the claims for Fed independence are overstated.
First, for the reasons discussed above, the Fed must coordinate with Treasury operations to ensure it can hit overnight rate targets. Second, the Fed is a "creature of Congress," created by public law that has been amended several times. This is recognized by the Fed, itself. As already discussed above, MacLaury put it this way:
the Federal Reserve System is more appropriately thought of as being "insulated" from, rather than independent of, political-government and banking-special interest pressures.
In effect, the [1951] 14 Our understanding of policy, of the policy space available to the sovereign, and of the operational realities of fiscal and monetary policy would be improved if we abandoned the myth of central bank independence.
